A Spoonful of Sugarcane Ethanol: A Green Tax Medicine for the Cellulosic Ethanol Industry by Huang, Ke
  1117 
Note 
A Spoonful of Sugarcane Ethanol: A Green Tax 
Medicine for the Cellulosic Ethanol Industry 
Ke M. Huang* 
On July 31, 2013, INEOS Bio, a bioenergy company,1 
announced that its Florida facility became the world pioneer in 
producing commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol.2 Ethanol, or 
ethyl alcohol,3 is a renewable fuel resulting from fermenting 
plant-based materials.4 INEOS Bio produces cellulosic ethanol 
using vegetative and yard waste.5 
Despite the flurry that accompanied last July’s event, 
Brazil is still regarded as the country that implemented the 
most successful ethanol industry in the world6—the sugarcane 
ethanol industry. 
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 1.   Profile, INEOS BIO, http://www.ineos.com/en/businesses/INEOS-
Bio/Company/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 2. INEOS Bio Produces Cellulosic Ethanol at Commercial Scale, INEOS 
BIO (July 31, 2013), http://www.ineos.com/en/businesses/INEOS-Bio/News/
INEOS-Bio-Produces-Cellulosic-Ethanol/ [hereinafter INEOS Bio]. 
 3. L. Leon Geyer et al., Ethanol, Biomass, Biofuels and Energy: A Profile 
and Overview, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 63 (2007). 
 4. David N. Cassuto & Carolina Gueiros, The Evolution of the Brazilian 
Regulation of Ethanol and Possible Lessons for the United States, 30 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 477, 480 (2012). 
 5. INEOS Bio, supra note 2. 
 6. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1082–83 
(9th Cir. 2013) (low carbon intensity); Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, 
Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
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In the United States, the ethanol industry touches on two 
critical areas. First, ethanol can be used as motor fuel,7 and it 
is no secret that the United States relies on motor fuel.8 
Second, the nation’s reliance on motor fuel, especially gasoline, 
raises significant environmental concerns, notably, greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions.9 
Thus, given the recent advancements in ethanol 
production, and the critical areas that ethanol touches on, an 
issue emerges as to whether Brazil’s ethanol policy model can 
be instructive to the United States’ fledgling cellulosic ethanol 
industry. 
This Note seeks to suggest changes to the tax benefits of 
the U.S. cellulosic ethanol industry. Part I will present, 
primarily by focusing on federal tax policies and environmental 
effects linked with ethanol, (1) the trajectory of the United 
States’ corn and cellulosic ethanol industries; and (2) the 
trajectory of Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry. Part II (1) 
reviews the relevant existing literature addressing ethanol; (2) 
compares and contrasts the federal ethanol tax benefits of the 
United States’ and Brazil’s ethanol industries; (3) compares 
and contrasts these industries’ impact on the respective 
country’s environment; and (4) explains why Brazil’s tax 
benefits should encourage the United States to implement 
similar benefits. This Note concludes that revising some of the 
U.S. cellulosic ethanol tax benefits, following Brazil’s ethanol 
industry tax benefits, will likely spur the U.S. cellulosic ethanol 
industry, which would ultimately result in significant 
environmental benefits. 
                                                          
& POL’Y F. 43, 54 (2008) (cheaper to produce); Nancy I. Potter, Note, How 
Brazil Achieved Energy Independence and the Lessons the United States 
Should Learn from Brazil’s Experience, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
331, 347–48 (2008) (efficient to produce). 
 7. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1088 (“Indeed, the 
[fuel] market relies on th[e] undifferentiated structure [of ethanol] because 
ethanol from different regions . . . is regularly mixed together in the fuel 
supply.”). 
 8. Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment 
Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 473–74, 507 (2010) (noting that Presidents 
Bush and Obama stated that the United States is figuratively addicted to oil). 
 9. Cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of 
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 196 (2013) 
[hereinafter Klass, Climate Change] (describing a methodology of analyzing 
motor fuel carbon emissions and their impact on the environment). 
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I. ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS10: IS THE SUGARCANE 
ALWAYS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE?11 
Policymakers draw ethanol along several lines. Foremost, 
ethanol is a class of biofuel—a fuel produced from biomass.12 
Ethanol can also have a generation designation. First-
generation ethanol is fermented from biomass containing 
simple sugars, such as cornstarch13 and sugarcane juice.14 
Second-generation ethanol, or cellulosic ethanol,15 is fermented 
from lignocellulosic biomass.16 Finally, ethanol, when used as a 
motor fuel blend, is designated by a percentage figure. While 
pure ethanol can serve as motor fuel in certain kinds of 
                                                          
 10. “Ethanol tax benefits” encompass a wide range of terms ranging from 
direct subsidies to fiscal regulations that indirectly favor the ethanol industry, 
and all of the tax incentives that fall in between. For example, Brazil’s 
Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico is a federal tax that 
implicitly benefits Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry by taxing gasoline 
importers at much higher rates than its ethanol counterparts. Cassuto & 
Gueiros, supra note 4, at 490. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits, 
Property Rights, and Mandates: Considering the Future of Government 
Support for Renewable Energy 5–6 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 13-11, 2013) [hereinafter Klass, 
Tax Benefits], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222987 (describing U.S. 
tax benefits for various kinds of renewable energy). 
 11. For U.S. state ethanol policies, see, for example, Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1104 n.14. For Brazilian state ethanol policies, 
see, for example, Paulina Calfucoy, The Brazilian Experience in Building a 
Sustainable and Competitive Biofuel Industry, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 558, 591–93 
(2012). 
 12. “Biomass” (which some commentators call “feedstock”) is organic 
material used to produce biofuels. E.g., Vincent Barbera, Comment, Tomorrow 
Today? Cellulosic Ethanol: How It’s Done, Who’s Getting It Done, and Its 
Environmental Impact, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 30 (2009) (describing 
cellulosic biomass). Other than ethanol, biofuels include biodiesel “and other 
renewable liquid fuels.” U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BIOFUELS ISSUES AND 
TRENDS 1 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/biofuels/issuestrends/pdf/
bit.pdf. 
 13. Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard 
Eventually End Corn Ethanol’s Reign, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 675 (2010). 
 14. CONSTANZA VALDES, USDA, BRAZIL’S ETHANOL INDUSTRY: LOOKING 
FORWARD 7 (2011). 
 15. Powers, supra note 13, at 675. 
 16. “Lignocellulosic” biomass encompasses “crops, trees, forest residues, 
and agricultural residues not specifically grown for food.” Energy Policy Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 932, 119 Stat. 594, 870; cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 
EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[C]ellulosic biofuel [is] an advanced 
fuel derived from sources of lignocellulose, such as switchgrass and 
agricultural wastes . . . .”). For an explanation of third-generation ethanol, see 
Powers, supra note 13, at 676. 
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vehicles,17 legislation addressing ethanol mostly concerns 
gasoline and ethanol blends.18 These blends are abbreviated as 
“E,” followed by a figure that denotes the percentage of ethanol 
blended in the motor fuel.19 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the corn and cellulosic ethanol 
industries are in many ways distinct in terms of federal policy 
programs and environmental effects. 
1. Corn Ethanol 
Though the corn ethanol industry is distinct from the 
cellulosic ethanol industry, a discussion of cellulosic ethanol 
would be incomplete without mentioning corn ethanol.20 First, 
corn ethanol dominates the U.S. ethanol industry.21 Not only is 
the United States the world’s largest consumer22 and exporter23 
of ethanol, but almost all the ethanol produced in the United 
States uses corn as biomass.24 In addition, ethanol consumers 
generally cannot distinguish between different varieties of 
ethanol, because the varieties are often blended in the same 
gallon of motor fuel.25 
In 2011, the U.S. corn ethanol production totaled about 
13.9 billion gallons,26 most of it produced in the Midwest.27 
                                                          
 17. VALDES, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
 18. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (describing the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, which has the effect of 
increasing the U.S. national gasoline and ethanol blends); Cassuto & Gueiros, 
supra note 4, at 489 (describing a 2003 Brazilian law that mandated that 
twenty-two percent of the motor fuel in Brazil be blended with ethanol). 
 19. For example, E10 means a motor fuel blended with ten percent 
ethanol. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 172. 
 20. See Matthew L. Wald, Fuel from Waste, Poised at a Milestone, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, at B1 [hereinafter Wald, Fuel from Waste] (quoting a 
spokesperson of a biotechnology trade organization stating that it is 
impossible to “de-link” ethanol and advanced biofuels); About BIO, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., http://www.bio.org/articles/about-bio (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 21. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 172 (“[R]efiners and importers 
primarily blend corn-based ethanol into the fuel supply.”). 
 22. VALDES, supra note 14, at 16. 
 23. Id. at 18. 
 24. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12, at 6. 
 25. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 26. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12, at 6. 
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Critics of corn ethanol identify concerns with ethanol 
production in at least two areas—the democratic process and 
the environment.28 
a. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies 
The impetus of Congress’s implementation of the most 
recent federal corn-ethanol tax benefits and related policies 
was the 1970s oil crises that resulted from political turmoil in 
certain Middle Eastern countries.29 In the first oil crisis in the 
early 1970s, the U.S. gasoline consumers experienced shortages 
and retail price hikes of about 40%.30 In the second crisis, in 
the late 1970s, retail prices increased about 30%.31 In response, 
Congress sought to spur corn ethanol—along with natural gas 
and other biofuels—to encourage energy independence.32 While 
later federal corn ethanol policies also addressed other goals, 
notably environmental goals such as reduction of air 
pollutants33 and GHG emissions,34 energy independence goals 
have remained in the foreground of many policies.35 
Other than corn ethanol tax benefits, major related federal 
policies include the Oxygenated Fuels, Reformulated Gasoline 
(RFG), and Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) programs.36 Until 
                                                          
 27. See Ethanol Facilities’ Capacity by State, NEB. ENERGY OFF., 
http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/121.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing 
the seven highest ranked states, all located in the Midwest, which operated at 
a production of about 10.4 billion gallons). 
 28. See infra Part I.A.1.a–.b. 
 29. James A. Duffield et al., Ethanol Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 53 
S.D. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (2008). 
 30. Id. at 427. 
 31. Id. at 428. 
 32. Id.; Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 44 (“In 1978, Congress enacted 
the first tax incentives for ethanol production to reduce dependence on foreign 
oil.”). 
 33. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 430. 
 34. Id. at 439. “Greenhouse gas emissions” have been well recognized as 
the main contributor to global warming. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
504–05 (2007). GHGs include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and 
hydrofluorocarbons. Id. at 510, 529. While the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Massachusetts v. EPA that a statutory definition of “air pollutant” could 
encompass GHGs, id. at 528–29, for the sake of clarity, this Note provides an 
independent analysis of air pollutants—such as traditional pollutants from 
tailpipe emissions—and GHG emissions. Accord Duffield et al., supra note 29, 
at 449–50. 
 35. E.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
140, 121 Stat. 1492 (emphasis added). 
 36. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52–53. 
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January 2012, the main ethanol tax benefit was the Volumetric 
Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, which offered a $0.45 per gallon 
credit37 to blenders that mix corn ethanol in motor fuel.38 
Additionally, small producers39 could be eligible for an 
additional $0.10 per gallon.40 
The Oxygenated Fuels Program, designed to control carbon 
monoxide (CO) during winter months, requires motor fuel to 
contain at least 2.7% oxygen content.41 This goal was often 
achieved by mixing motor fuel with at least 7.5% of ethanol.42 
In December 2010, all targeted areas achieved federal ambient 
air standards for CO.43 
The RFG Program, eliminated in 2005, required motor fuel 
to contain at least 2% of oxygen44 as to reduce harmful tailpipe 
emissions.45 As with the Oxygenated Fuels Program, in 
practice, the RFG Program mainly used ethanol.46 
Finally, the RFS, the dominant corn ethanol policy in 
effect,47 mandates, in broad terms, for the EPA to promulgate48 
a renewable fuel phase-in.49 The RFS, introduced in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 and incorporated in the Clean Air Act,50 was 
amended in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
                                                          
 37. A “tax credit” is a kind of tax benefit that reduces a taxpayer’s tax 
liability dollar-for-dollar. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 873 (17th ed. 2013). 
 38. Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 8. 
 39. The Internal Revenue Code defined “small producer” as having a 
capacity not exceeding sixty million gallons per year. Mann & Hymel, supra 
note 6, at 48–49. 
 40. Id. at 48. 
 41. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 447. 
 42. Id. 
 43. YANN LING-BARNES, WASHOE COUNTY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011–2012 
OXYGENATED FUELS PROGRAM FOR WASHOE COUNTY 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.washoecounty.us/repository/files/4/2011-2012-Oxy-Fuel-Report-
April-2012.pdf. 
 44. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 448. 
 45. Id. at 447. These harmful tailpipe emissions include CO, ground-level 
ozone, and other pollutants. Id. at 448. 
 46. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52. 
 47. See Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 8 (“While Congress allowed 
the bulk of the tax credits for biofuels to expire at the end of 2011, this action 
did not meet with significant resistance from the biofuels industry primarily 
because of the [RFS].”). 
 48. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 49. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435. 
 50. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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(EISA)51 partly to address the environmental concerns 
resulting from corn ethanol.52 The RFS allows qualifying motor 
fuel suppliers to blend up to fifteen billion gallons of corn 
ethanol per year.53 
Several scholars argue that, especially with the phasing 
out of corn-ethanol tax benefits, the RFS has been the main 
federal policy in spurring corn ethanol production.54 When the 
RFS was first introduced, corn ethanol made up less than 4% of 
the amount of motor fuel volume; in 2011, the amount rose to 
about 10.6%.55 
Scholars also posit that corn ethanol implicates interests 
that undermine representative democracy. Iowa, the leading 
ethanol-producing state and the first state to hold a 
presidential primary, is often the platform where presidential 
candidates vouch support for ethanol.56 Some commentators 
assert that ethanol production only benefits a few big 
agribusinesses.57 
b. Environmental Effects 
Experts in scientific and policy-making fields have 
assessed the environmental effect of corn ethanol production in 
terms of GHG emissions, air pollutant emissions, and land use. 
Although corn ethanol was important to the air pollutant 
reduction legislative goals in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990,58 ever since 2007, the efficacy of corn ethanol with regard 
to its GHG-emission reduction has been under attack. When 
employing the lifecycle analysis to find carbon intensity of 
different varieties of ethanol,59 corn ethanol is found to be more 
                                                          
 51. Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 475. 
 52. Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 24. 
 53. Powers, supra note 13, at 695. 
 54. E.g., Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 24–25; Powers, supra note 
13, at 705–07. 
 55. Bioenergy: Background, USDA ECON. RES. SERVICE, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/bioenergy/background.aspx#
.Um17nJR-RN0 (last updated May 27, 2012). 
 56. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 73. 
 57. E.g., id. at 72; Powers, supra note 13, at 685–86. 
 58. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 431; see supra notes 44–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. “Lifecycle analysis” can address a kind of ethanol’s “carbon intensity,” 
i.e., the GHG emissions resulting from production and transportation of a kind 
of ethanol. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2013); see also Klass, Climate Change, supra note 9, at 196–97. 
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carbon-intensive than, for example, sugarcane ethanol.60 In 
addition, some researchers point to the relationship between 
higher GHG emissions and indirect land use changes.61 
According to these researchers, because increases in corn prices 
encourage developing countries to convert rainforests and 
peatlands for agricultural production (or even for biofuel 
production), and these previously nonagricultural lands can no 
longer be as effective in sequestering GHGs, this course of 
events leads to higher GHG emissions.62 
While Congress passed legislation favorable to corn 
ethanol to abate automobile air pollutant emissions,63 empirical 
data have not fully confirmed corn ethanol’s effectiveness in 
abating these emissions. Growing corn could threaten public 
health, because the practice increases the amount of airborne 
chemicals.64 In addition, regarding the Oxygenated Fuel 
Program, corn ethanol may not have been the contributing 
factor in declining CO.65 Finally, regarding the RFG Program, 
while commentators concede that RFG is one of the factors for 
the long-term downward trend in smog, commentators are 
uncertain of how much RFG contributed to that trend.66 Also, 
because the EPA measures gasoline volatility differently 
between blended motor fuel and RFG, it is possible that 
increased use of ethanol could result in higher emissions of 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs).67 This increase in 
emissions could ultimately result in higher emissions of 
ground-level ozone.68 
Corn ethanol production potentially raises several 
environmental concerns related to land use. Increased corn 
                                                          
 60. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082, 1110 (listing 
that “Ethanol from Sugarcane” has a lower carbon intensity value than 
“Ethanol from Corn”). 
 61. Powers, supra note 13, at 687. 
 62. Id. at 684–88. 
 63. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (explaining the 
Oxygenated Fuels Program and the RFG Program). 
 64. Powers, supra note 13, at 684. 
 65. Commentators point to other factors that could be the root of decline, 
such as the changes in the automobile industry. Duffield et al., supra note 29, 
at 447–48 (summarizing the findings and detailing two pieces of research 
scholarship). 
 66. Id. at 449. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 448 (“Ozone is not usually emitted directly into the air, but 
at ground level by a chemical reaction between oxides of nitrogen . . . and 
volatile organic compounds . . . in the presence of sunlight.”). 
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ethanol production could raise geographically related land use 
issues, because the production is concentrated in the 
Midwest.69 These land use issues are related to higher soil 
erosion and soil nutrient loss.70 Additionally, some scholars 
underscore concerns related to biodiversity that result from 
continued corn production, such as the reduction of biome71 and 
displacement of land that would otherwise qualify for 
conservation.72 Finally, land use incurred during corn ethanol 
production raises environmental issues related to water supply 
in several ways. Not only is corn ethanol production water-
intensive,73 but production results in potentially hazardous 
water runoffs. Since corn production requires fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides; and ethanol plants emit VOCs; the 
net result from these chemicals is the production of runoffs that 
pollute water bodies in the Midwest and create eutrophication 
in and around the Gulf of Mexico.74 
2. Cellulosic Ethanol 
Even if INEOS Bio won the race for producing cellulosic 
ethanol on a commercial scale, the race has more participants 
not far behind. The companies POET and Abengoa, located in 
Iowa and Kansas respectively, claim they are close to producing 
cellulosic ethanol.75 POET intends to use biomass made out of 
corncobs and Abengoa, biomass of agricultural waste, wood 
waste, and nonfood crops.76 
Commentators and researchers predict that the U.S. 
cellulosic ethanol industry will have other features. Some 
commentators posit that corn stover—the in-field residue after 
                                                          
 69. See supra text accompanying note 27; cf. Duffield et al., supra note 29, 
at 452 (“[T]he production of [cellulosic] feedstocks would not be concentrated 
in one region of the United States, as is the case with corn.”); Mann & Hymel, 
supra note 6, at 76 (“The most significant environmental effects of ethanol 
production result from increased acreage in corn.”). 
 70. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 75 (“[T]he removal of biomass for energy 
production intensifies soil erosion, water runoff, and soil nutrient loss.”). 
 71. E.g., Powers, supra note 13, at 684. 
 72. Id. at 684–85. 
 73. Id. at 683–84 (“Corn is an extremely input-intensive crop, which 
requires massive amounts of water.”); see Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 76–
77 (“A biorefinery that produces [100,000,000] gallons of ethanol per year 
would use as much water as a town of about [500,000] people.”). 
 74. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 75–76; Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 
76; Powers, supra note 13, at 683–84. 
 75. Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20. 
 76. Id. 
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corn harvest77—will become the main biomass for cellulosic 
ethanol, because Midwestern corn-ethanol plants could 
economically adapt their current production into employing 
corn stover.78 Other commentators cite switchgrass as a 
suitable cellulosic biomass option.79 Finally, researchers from 
the influential Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)80 list other 
biomass, such as willow and poplar, as potential candidates for 
cellulosic ethanol.81 
a. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies 
Federal policies favoring cellulosic ethanol had their origin 
in the Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000 (BRDA), 
which funded competitive research programs with the purpose 
of encouraging breakthroughs in various sources of renewable 
energy.82 Yet, it was not until the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
that Congress directly addressed cellulosic ethanol. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 addressed cellulosic ethanol 
in three ways: the Cellulosic Biomass Program, amendments to 
the BRDA, and a reverse auction program.83 Under the 
                                                          
 77. ZHICHAO WANG ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., MATERIAL AND ENERGY 
FLOWS IN THE PRODUCTION OF CELLULOSIC FEEDSTOCKS FOR BIOFUELS FOR 
THE GREET MODEL 3 (2013), available at http://greet.es.anl.gov/files/
feedstocks-13. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 73; cf. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21 
(“Currently there are public and private [switchgrass] breeding programs 
throughout the United States.”). 
 80. See Brief for Professors of Environmental Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants at 21, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 
730 F.3d. 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135) (explaining that the 
lifecycle analysis model maintained by the Argonne National Laboratory 
influences regulatory agencies in five U.S. states). 
 81. See WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at i (listing the varieties of biomass 
discussed in the report). 
 82. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 436. 
 83. The amendments to BRDA refined the BRDA’s goals and redirected 
research emphasis. Id. The amendments aimed at facilitating the production 
of cellulosic ethanol. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Biofuels—Snake Oil for the 
Twenty-First Century, 87 OR. L. REV. 1183, 1244 (2008). Since then, the Farm 
Bill of 2014 further amended the BRDA to continue to award research and 
development programs. H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted); 
Advancing Bioenergy Technologies, BIOMASS RES. & DEV., 
http://www.biomassboard.gov/ (last updated Dec. 27, 2012); SI Staff, President 
Obama Signs Farm Bill into Law, SOLAR INDUSTRY (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.1
3788.  
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Cellulosic Biomass Program, Congress introduced RFS 
requirements84 for cellulosic ethanol and introduced other 
programs.85 
After the RFS for cellulosic ethanol was introduced, the 
RFS was amended by the EISA.86 Under the current RFS, 
cellulosic ethanol falls under the definition of “cellulosic 
biofuels,” what the RFS defined as a kind of “advanced 
biofuel.”87 The RFS sets targets that are subject to the EPA’s 
adjustments.88 For example, by 2012, half a billion gallons of 
ethanol sold in the United States must be cellulosic biofuel, and 
by 2022, the cellulosic biofuel must be more than three 
quarters of the amount of advanced biofuel.89 Yet, in its 
implementation, the cellulosic biofuel part of the RFS has been 
more complex. In 2011, the EPA projected that cellulosic 
biofuel production could reach 6.6 million gallons, when the 
figure was really zero.90 Under the RFS Program, the EPA 
projections are key because, if the projections are lower than 
the RFS mandated amount, the EPA Administrator may lower 
the mandated amount accordingly.91 
Other than the RFS, the programs nested in the Cellulosic 
Biomass Program included programs for (1) cellulosic ethanol 
production loans; (2) research on cellulosic ethanol production; 
                                                          
Last, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the reverse auction program 
allows the Secretary of Energy to buy the first billion gallons of cellulosic 
ethanol. 42 U.S.C. § 16251(c) (2006); Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 65. An 
observer suggested that the reverse auction program could lower the 
transaction costs of cellulosic ethanol. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 65 
(“[R]everse actions . . . can lower the cost of procuring products and services.” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 84. See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text for discussion on the 
role of the RFS in spurring corn ethanol production. 
 85. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435. 
 86. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 87. Id. at 476. “Advanced biofuels” achieve a lifecycle GHG emission 
displacement of fifty percent compared to gasoline. Powers, supra note 13, at 
699–700; Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 480–81. 
 88. Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 475. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 477. 
 91. Id. at 476. Indeed, in 2013, the EPA projections and the 
Administrator’s mandated determinations were subject to litigation in 
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. The American Petroleum Institute (API) 
is a fossil fuel energy trade association. About API, AM. PETROLEUM INST., 
http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpages/about-api (last visited Mar. 
2, 2014). The API petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review the EPA’s 2012 RFS 
rule and the EPA’s refusal to lower the 2012 mandates. Am. Petroleum Inst., 
706 F.3d at 476. The D.C. Circuit vacated the 2012 RFS rule. Id. at 481. 
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and (3) the Department of Energy to create an Advanced 
Biofuels Technologies Program.92 
Unlike other cellulosic ethanol federal policies, the tax 
incentives directed at cellulosic ethanol were introduced in 
2006. Two of the tax incentives are still in effect. The Tax 
Relief and Health Act of 2006 provided that cellulosic biomass 
ethanol plants in service before January 1, 2013 may receive a 
fifty percent bonus depreciation.93 Since then, the American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the bonus depreciation to 
January 1, 2014 and broadened “cellulosic biomass ethanol” to 
apply to any “cellulosic biofuel.”94 The Senate Finance 
Committee Majority cited reasons for the 2012 change, three of 
which relate to cellulosic ethanol: fostering technological 
development, encouraging energy independence, and creating 
manufacturing jobs in the United States.95 
The Farm Bill of 2008 provided the second tax incentive—a 
credit to motor fuel producers that blend ethanol in motor 
fuel.96 The credit includes cellulosic ethanol, which may receive 
$1.01 per gallon credit.97 Like the bonus depreciation, the 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the credit to 
December 31, 2013 and broadened “cellulosic biofuel” to apply 
to “second generation biofuel.”98 The Senate Finance 
Committee Majority cited two reasons related to cellulosic 
ethanol for the 2012 change—(1) spurring further commercial 
biofuel development; and (2) ensuring energy independence 
through fostering a diversity of fuel sources.99 
                                                          
 92. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435. 
 93. I.R.C. § 168(l)(1) (2012); Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52 n.69. A 
“bonus depreciation” is a kind of tax benefit that enables a taxpayer to 
depreciate a property the first year the property enters into operation. A Brief 
Overview of Depreciation, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/A-Brief-Overview-of-Depreciation (last updated 
Sept. 16, 2013). 
 94. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 410, 126 
Stat. 2313, 2342–43 (2013). 
 95. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96 (2012). But see id. at 112 (“[The Committee 
Minority is] concerned that the relentless dedication to subsidizing so-called 
‘green energy’ will prevent the most efficient development of energy sources 
and cause a loss of jobs in the broader economy.”). 
 96. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 49. 
 97. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 
§ 15321, 122 Stat. 923, 1512. 
 98. § 404, 126 Stat. at 2338–39. 
 99. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 85 (2012). But see supra note 95 for the quote 
from the Committee Minority. 
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b. Environmental Effects 
Since cellulosic ethanol has only recently become 
commercially viable, the studies addressing environmental 
effects of cellulosic ethanol are inchoate, if not speculative.100 
The available results based on cellulosic ethanol produced in 
the experimental stage101 address areas such as GHG 
emissions, impact on biodiversity, and the land use 
implications. 
There are mixed views on the issue of GHG emissions 
resulting from the production of cellulosic ethanol. An INEOS 
Bio chief executive argued that the company’s ethanol 
production process is “carbon-negative.” This executive 
reasoned that the electricity produced from the INEOS Bio 
plant precludes GHG emissions that would have come from 
more GHG-intensive sources.102 Yet, according to a 2013 ANL 
report, production of cellulosic ethanol is not completely free 
from GHG emissions. On the one hand, the report listed the 
relative environmental advantages of native North American 
plants such as switchgrass.103 On the other hand, the report 
pointed to the way that production of ethanol from certain 
cellulosic biomass could emit more GHGs. Biomass such as 
corn stover may require increased use of fertilizers.104 To 
achieve optimal yield, even switchgrass requires use of 
fertilizers.105 Finally, the report communicated the GHG-
emission concerns of growing nonnative plants, since growing 
these plants in greenhouses is energy intensive.106 
Regarding the environmental impact of cellulosic ethanol 
on biodiversity, observers’ views depend on the kind of biomass 
                                                          
 100. See WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 54–55 (listing outstanding issues 
in production and conversion technologies for cellulosic biomass feedstocks). 
 101. See, e.g., Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 565 (noting the cellulosic ethanol 
from Sweden and Switzerland). 
 102. Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20. But cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 
EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing the petitioner arguing that 
cellulosic biofuel facility owners tend toward overstatement). 
 103. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21. 
 104. Id. at 10–11. For ANL’s lifecycle analysis, fertilizer use is an 
important factor. Id. at 10; cf. Robert Sanders, Fertilizer Use Responsible for 
Increase in Nitrous Oxide in Atmosphere, UC BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Apr. 
2, 2012), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2012/04/02/fertilizer-use-responsible-
for-increase-in-nitrous-oxide-in-atmosphere/ (“[I]ncreased fertilizer use . . . is 
responsible for a dramatic rise in atmospheric nitrous oxide, which is a major 
[GHG] contributing to global climate change.”). 
 105. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 23. 
 106. Id. at 14. 
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producers use, and where their production takes place. By 
supposing that cellulosic ethanol is produced from woody fibers, 
some observers speculate that the impact of cellulosic ethanol 
production on the ecosystem is negligible.107 Yet, by supposing 
that the cellulosic ethanol is produced from switchgrass, 
observers speculate that this grass could become invasive, or 
lead to displacement of species from their habitat.108 Moreover, 
because the EPA allows cellulosic biomass to grow in 
Conservation Reserve Program land,109 this EPA practice could 
threaten biodiversity among plant species, a threat that would 
be more serious if the plants were genetically modified.110 
The land use effects of growing cellulosic biomass, 
especially compared to growing corn, seem more positive. 
Unlike corn ethanol production’s concentration in the Midwest, 
cellulosic ethanol production may be more dispersed.111 Also, 
growing cellulosic biomass, such as switchgrass, requires less 
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides.112 Further, a scholar 
found that cellulosic biomass, when compared to corn, is more 
beneficial to soil fertility and more conducive to reducing 
erosion.113 Finally, the 2013 ANL report noted the 
characteristics of certain plants that could result in positive 
land use effects. For example, miscanthus x giganteus is 
efficient in terms of water use,114 and short-rotation woody 
crops, such as willow and poplar, grow quickly.115 
Despite these potential environmental benefits, even the 
INEOS Bio Chief Operating Officer admits that his Florida 
plant has yet to achieve optimal yield: “Now we want to 
produce more ethanol from a ton of wood, rather than just 
making ethanol from a ton of wood.”116 
                                                          
 107. See Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 498 (“[The sources for 
cellulosic ethanol] require less energy, fertilizer, [and] water . . . .”). 
 108. Barbera, supra note 12, at 40–41. 
 109. “Conservation Reserve Program” is a scheme where the Department 
of Agriculture pays farmers to set aside and restore or protect 
environmentally sensitive lands. Powers, supra note 13, at 701. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 452. 
 112. Barbera, supra note 12, at 38; cf. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21 
(“[Switchgrass] has consistently high yields with minimal inputs and is well-
suited to marginal land.”). 
 113. Barbera, supra note 12, at 39 & n.92. 
 114. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 13. 
 115. Id. at 28. 
 116. Matthew L. Wald, Milestone Claimed in Creating Fuel from Waste, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/business/
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B. BRAZIL 
While Brazil has experimented with biofuels such as palm 
oil,117 sugarcane ethanol is still Brazil’s dominant biofuel.118 In 
2009, Brazil produced about 6.9 billion gallons of sugarcane 
ethanol,119 most of it in the Southeast.120 Brazil’s sugarcane is 
likewise grown mostly in the Southeast.121 Still, Brazil’s 
ethanol use is more widespread. About 16% of the nation’s 
vehicles may run on ethanol (these vehicles are called flex-fuel 
vehicles (FFVs)).122 In 2009, about 90% of new vehicles in 
Brazil were FFVs.123 
1. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies 
In the 1970s, Brazil—then ruled under a military 
dictatorship124—first enacted tax benefits aimed at encouraging 
energy independence.125 The 1970s oil crises had a sobering 
effect on Brazil because it imported eighty percent of its oil.126 
Indeed, from the 1970s to the mid-1980s dictatorship era, 
the government developed and sustained a host of policies 
favoring sugarcane ethanol. These policies became more 
aggressive over time. At first, the policies—such as blending 
mandates127 were aimed at developing ethanol to supplement 
gasoline,128 but, starting in 1979, the government turned its 
                                                          
energy-environment/company-says-its-the-first-to-make-ethanol-from-
waste.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Wald, Milestone Claimed]. 
 117. Sandra Dos Santos, Comment, The Tainted Grail of Brazilian 
Ethanol: Achieving Oil Independence but Who Has Borne the Cost and Paid 
the Price?, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 87 (2007). 
 118. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496. 
 119. VALDES, supra note 14, at 10 (26.1 billion liters); Liters to US Gallons 
(Liquid), METRIC CONVERSIONS, http://www.metric-conversions.org/volume/
liters-to-us-liquid-gallons.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2013). 
 120. VALDES, supra note 14, at 10. 
 121. Id. at 5. 
 122. Ethanol Fuel in Brazil, UN-ENERGY KNOWLEDGE NETWORK (Jan. 8, 
2011), http://www.un-energy.org/stories/38-ethanol-fuel-in-brazil. 
 123. Roberto Samora, Gabrielli: Etanol Reduzirá Mercado de Gasolina a 
17% até 2020, G1 (June 2, 2009), http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/
0,,MUL1180455-5602,00-GABRIELLI+ETANOL+REDUZIRA+MERCADO+
DE+GASOLINA+A+ATE.html. 
 124. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 482 & n.29. 
 125. EDNALDO MICHELLON ET AL., BREVE DESCRIÇÃO DO PROÁLCOOL E 
PERSPECTIVAS FUTURAS PARA O ETANOL PRODUZIDO NO BRASIL 11 (2008), 
available at http://www.sober.org.br/palestra/9/574.pdf. 
 126. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 482. 
 127. Id. at 481. 
 128. Id. at 482. 
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attention to pure ethanol129 through production mandates for 
the ethanol industry, agreements with FFV manufacturers, 
and tax benefits to FFV buyers.130 Through all those years, the 
government implemented several financial measures, which 
included loans and subsidies to energy producers, investment 
in genetically modified sugarcane, and setting up ethanol.131 
After the military dictatorship regime ended in Brazil, for 
less than a decade, Brazil’s ethanol market stagnated;132 yet, 
starting in the 1990s, Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry 
thrived anew. In 1985, Brazil’s military dictatorship ended and 
the nation started to transition to democracy.133 The previous 
ethanol policy incentives were no longer viable in a nation that 
faced inflation and trade imbalance, and thus most of the 
policies were dismantled.134 But starting in the early 1990s, 
Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry began to convalesce. 
Two major factors contributed to the industry’s recovery—
market forces and environmental awareness. In the area of 
market forces, the sugarcane ethanol industry modernized 
itself to remain competitive,135 oil prices spiked due to 
instability in some regions in the Middle East,136 and, in 2003, 
commercially viable FFVs were introduced in the automobile 
market.137 In the area of environmental awareness, in 1993, 
Brazil enacted E22 mandates to reduce air pollutant 
emissions,138 and, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol created greater 
awareness of the need to enlist renewable fuels as to reduce 
GHG emissions.139 
Currently, Brazil has in place three major federal policies 
that regulate its sugarcane industry: mandated blending rates, 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 484. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 483, 485. 
 132. Id. at 486. 
 133. Id. at 485. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 486–87. “Agriculture was mechanized, scientists experimented 
with new variations of sugar cane, strategic mergers and acquisitions were 
carried out, and mills and distilleries were modernized. Many private 
institutions arose as well.” Id. at 487. 
 136. Id. at 487. 
 137. Id. at 487–88. “The Brazilian flex-fuel engine runs on any combination 
of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline blend, as well as [pure ethanol]. By 
contrast, [FFVs] produced in other countries operate on a blend of a maximum 
of [E85].” Id. at 488. 
 138. Id. at 486. 
 139. Id. at 487. 
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credits for the ethanol industry, and various tax benefits.140 
Historically, Brazil has had mandates for ethanol blends in 
motor fuel.141 The government adjusts the mandate according 
to market conditions.142 In April 2013, the Brazilian federal 
government announced that to spur ethanol investment and 
supply, it would increase the mandate from E20 to E25.143 
Like the mandated blending rates, financial assistance to 
the ethanol industry in Brazil is not historically unseen.144 In 
fact, credit programs have proliferated since the mid-2000s.145 
In 2010, the Central Bank of Brazil established a credit line of 
about $1.37 billion to assist ethanol plants, distilleries, 
production cooperatives, trading companies, etc.146 
Formally, Brazil has three federal tax benefits in place. 
First, the Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico 
(CIDE, translated as “intervening contribution on the economic 
domain”) is collected to fund various transportation fuels and 
resources. The CIDE mainly funds: (1) ethanol, natural gas, 
and petroleum; (2) transportation facility programs; and (3) 
environmental projects addressing petroleum and gasoline 
issues.147 The CIDE itself affects both the gasoline and the 
ethanol industries, because gasoline import tariffs are about 
twenty-three times higher than ethanol.148 
Second, the Programas de Integração Social e de Formação 
do Patrimônio do Servidor Público (PIS/PASEP, translated as 
“programs of social integration and of establishment of public 
                                                          
 140. See id. at 488–89. 
 141. See id. at 484 (discussing the initial policy of mandatory minimum 
blends). 
 142. VALDES, supra note 14, at 24. 
 143. Fábio Amato, Governo Corta Tributos e Aumenta Percentual de Álcool 
na Gasolina, G1 ECONOMIA (Apr. 23, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://g1.globo.com/
economia/noticia/2013/04/governo-anuncia-medidas-para-o-setor-
sucroalcooleiro.html. 
 144. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 145. VALDES, supra note 14, at 24 (“Financing for the ethanol sector has 
risen since the mid-2000s, with the amount of credit granted increasing 
rapidly and new credit programs being implemented.”). 
 146. Ricardo Silva et al., International Energy and Natural Resources Law, 
45 INT’L LAW. 297, 298 (2011). 
 147. Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico (Cide), CÂMARA 
DOS DEPUTADOS (May 22, 2006, 10:20 AM), http://www2.camara.gov.br/
camaranoticias/noticias/88696.html. 
 148. See Lei No. 10.336, de 19 de Dezembro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 20.12.2001 (Braz.) (listing under article 5 that the gasoline 
tariff shall be R$860,00 per m3 (860,00 Brazilian Real per cubic meter), while 
ethanol is R$37,20 per m3). 
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servant endowment”) is collected to be spent on pensions for 
business and government employees.149 Until December 23, 
2013, the PIS/PASEP had a blender’s credit component for a 
producer, which is about $0.005 per gallon.150 Another relevant 
component of the PIS/PASEP is that, while a gasoline producer 
must pay 5.08% of its aggregate revenue,151 an ethanol 
producer only pays 1.5% of its aggregate revenue.152 
Finally, the Contribuição para o Financiamento da 
Seguridade Social (COFINS, translated as “contribution for the 
funding of social security”) is a tax collected for social security 
purposes.153 Until December 23, 2013, the COFINS credit for 
blenders was about $0.024 per gallon.154 For a gasoline 
producer, COFINS requires 23.44% of the producer’s aggregate 
revenue,155 while for an ethanol producer the figure is 6.9%.156 
                                                          
 149. PIS-Programa de Integração Social, CAIXA, http://www.caixa.gov.br/
voce/social/beneficios/pis/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 150. Decreto No. 6.573, de 19 de Setembro de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 22.9.2008 (Braz.) (listing under the stricken article 3(I) the 
amount of R$3,21 per m3); Cubic Meters to Gallons, METRIC CONVERSIONS, 
http://www.metric-conversions.org/volume/cubic-meters-to-gallons.htm (last 
updated Feb. 8, 2013); Convert United States Dollar to Brazilian Real, 
THEMONEYCONVERTER.COM, http://themoneyconverter.com/USD/BRL.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (reset “From USD to BRL” to “From BRL to USD” 
in the middle box).  
A motor fuel trade association executive explained that the government 
decided that the blender’s credit would not have an effect after May 2013. 
Decreto Zera Crédito de PIS/Cofins na Aquisição de Álcool à Gasolina, 
RURALBR AGRICULTURA (Dec. 24, 2013, 12:50 PM), http://
agricultura.ruralbr.com.br/noticia/2013/12/decreto-zera-credito-de-pis-cofins-
na-aquisicao-de-alcool-a-gasolina-4373642.html [hereinafter Decreto Zera]. 
 151. Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.) (listing under article 4(I) that the amount is 
5.08%). 
 152. Id. (listing under article 5(I) that the amount is 1.5%). 
 153. Under Brazil’s Federal Constitution, “social security” includes health 
and social welfare. COFINS, MASTERCLASS BRAZIL, http://
masterclassbrazil.com/managing-a-business-in-brazil/taxes/cofins/ (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2014). 
 154. See supra note 150 (citing to the decree article that lists the stricken 
COFINS credit as R$14,79 and relevant Internet sources to convert the listed 
figures). Similar to the PIS/PASEP blender’s credit, the COFINS blender’s 
credit had not been in effect since May 2013. Decreto Zera, supra note 150. 
 155. Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.) (listing under article 4(I) that the amount is 
23.44%). 
 156. Id. (listing under article 5(I) that amount is 6.9%). 
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2. Environmental Effects 
The environmental effects of the sugarcane ethanol 
industry touch on at least four areas—GHG emissions, air 
pollutant emissions, land use, and biodiversity.157 
When compared to corn ethanol and gasoline, sugarcane 
ethanol emits the lowest amount of GHGs. Unlike corn ethanol 
plants, which are usually powered by nonrenewable sources, 
such as coal or natural gas, Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol plants 
are mainly powered by renewable sources, such as 
hydroelectricity.158 Both the U.S. federal and state policies 
recognize sugarcane ethanol as raising fewer GHG-emission 
concerns than corn ethanol. According to EISA, sugarcane 
ethanol—not corn ethanol—is defined as an “advanced 
biofuel.”159 EISA recognizes that sugarcane ethanol achieves a 
lifecycle GHG-emission displacement half that of gasoline.160 
California—the state “in the vanguard of efforts to protect the 
environment”161—determined that the average Brazilian 
sugarcane ethanol production process emitted a lesser amount 
of GHGs than the U.S. corn ethanol process.162 
Yet, observers note that sugarcane ethanol production in 
Brazil is imperfect. Brazil is still in the process of abating a 
decades-old practice of clearing land by fire.163 In Brazil, 
farmers burn sugarcane fields twice a year before manual 
harvesting,164 but the burning would be unnecessary if the 
farmers mechanized the harvesting process.165 Unsurprisingly, 
the manual harvesting practice emits large amounts of carbon 
dioxide,166 the main GHG linked to climate change.167 While 
the Brazilian federal and state governments have taken 
measures to increase mechanization, the mandated 
                                                          
 157. Yet, the sugarcane ethanol industry is criticized for human rights 
violations. E.g., Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 88–91. 
 158. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1096 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
 159. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 
§ 201, 121 Stat. 1492, 1519. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1078. 
 162. Id. at 1110. 
 163. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28–29. 
 164. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 82. 
 165. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007). 
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mechanization adoption rate by 2014 is 40%, and only by 2017 
will the rate become 100%.168 
The effect of sugarcane ethanol on air quality has been 
mixed. On the one hand, ethanol use contributed to lower air 
pollutant emissions in many Brazilian cities.169 On the other 
hand, some commentators argue that ethanol production 
increased air pollutant emissions in rural areas. Not only does 
the burning of sugarcane raise GHG emission issues, but 
studies showed a relationship between the aerosol particles 
from burning sugarcane and respiratory ailments among rural 
residents.170 These ailments have a higher impact on younger 
and elderly residents.171 
The environmental threats to biodiversity in Brazil relate 
to Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado regions. Some commentators 
downplay the concern that the Amazon could be cleared for 
sugarcane fields because the land’s climate is not favorable to 
sugarcane cultivation,172 and the Brazilian Forest Code (BFC) 
requires eighty percent of the region to be unaltered.173 Still, 
the literature posits that the risks of deforestation in the region 
are not unfounded. First, even if sugarcane production in the 
region were unlikely to occur, industries and population 
displaced by the sugarcane ethanol industry could migrate to 
the Amazon.174 Second, enforcement of the BFC is likely to be 
imperfect.175 
Indeed, in the Cerrado region, many of the concerns 
associated with the Amazon have already occurred. The 
Cerrado is located in the Center-West176 and contains a wooded 
savanna with an endangered ecosystem.177 From the 1960s to 
the early 1990s, the Brazilian government fostered several 
agricultural development programs in the Cerrado, which 
                                                          
 168. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28–29. 
 169. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 80. 
 170. Id. at 83. 
 171. Id. at 83–85. 
 172. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 493. 
 173. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589. 
 174. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 493. 
 175. Id. at 494 (“[E]nforcement of [the BFC] presents significant 
challenges . . . where the vastness of the [Amazon] and the difficulties of 
assessing remote areas pose significant obstacles . . . .”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55 n.84 (“[The Cerrado] host[s] an 
estimated 160,000 species of animals and plants, many threatened with 
extinction.”). 
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benefitted soybean and oilseed production and, in turn, freed 
land for sugarcane ethanol production in the Southeast and 
South.178 Under the BFC, thirty-five percent of the Cerrado is 
reserved.179 Yet, like the enforcement of the BFC in the 
Amazon, the enforcement of the BFC in the Cerrado may be 
imperfect.180 
In addition to endangerment of biome by indirect 
expansion into the Amazon and the Cerrado, growing 
sugarcane raises land use concerns of soil erosion and water 
depletion. While some commentators conclude that the effect of 
soil erosion in sugarcane fields is widespread, others claim 
there are “conflicting reports” as to the actual risk of soil 
erosion.181 Regarding water depletion, the main concern of 
environmental advocates is that sugarcane ethanol plants 
produce wastewater that could threaten rural communities and 
Brazil’s interior.182 
These environmental findings suggest that many of 
Brazil’s legal and environmental characteristics are unique to 
the sugarcane ethanol industry, but a question remains 
whether these characteristics can be assimilated elsewhere. 
II. THE BRAZILIANIZATION OF CELLULOSIC ETHANOL: 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF EMULATING THE 
BRAZILIAN ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS 
A. THE LESSONS FROM BRAZIL 
An extensive literature has examined Brazil’s sugarcane 
ethanol policies with the purpose of improving the United 
States’ ethanol policies; however, while some authors come 
away with prescriptive recommendations, others conclude that 
there is little the United States can learn.183 
1. Lessons of Hope 
The recommendations in most articles focus on policies 
affecting the corn ethanol industry, either directly or indirectly. 
The recurring recommendations argue for increased 
                                                          
 178. VALDES, supra note 14, at 22. 
 179. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589. 
 180. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 494. 
 181. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 85. 
 182. Id. 
 183. But see Powers, supra note 13, at 707 (suggesting that the U.S. 
biofuels policy could “serve as a model for biofuels laws in other countries”). 
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government financial support and for general policies favoring 
biofuels.184 Other recommendations support spurring the 
overall corn ethanol market.185 One commentator suggests that 
any one policy recommendation does not necessarily preclude 
others; she advises that many policies be implemented in 
concert.186 
Several commentators underscore the Brazilian 
government’s investment-heavy policies, primarily when the 
sugarcane ethanol industry was nascent, to infer that the U.S. 
government should also offer munificent aid to corn ethanol 
producers and distributors.187 For the producers, government 
financial support could take the form of direct loans to 
companies188 or support through securing ethanol prices.189 For 
distributors, support could help develop ethanol supply 
infrastructure.190 One such kind of infrastructure is to 
encourage gas station operators to build E85 pumps191 because 
all Brazilian gas stations must offer, at minimum, E85.192 
Some commentators find that Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol 
success story does not necessarily translate in the United 
States into identical policies for corn ethanol. Rather, the 
lessons from Brazil showed that the U.S. government should 
spur biofuels generally.193 These commentators suggest that 
other biofuels, such as biodiesel,194 could be conscripted to 
supplement corn ethanol.195 A related approach is to enact 
legislation to encourage more efficient biofuel production.196 
The adherents of this approach suggest that efficient biofuel 
                                                          
 184. See infra text accompanying notes 187–92. 
 185. See infra text accompanying notes 193–97. 
 186. Potter, supra note 6, at 350. 
 187. E.g., Barbera, supra note 12, at 47. 
 188. Id. at 45, 47 & n.156. 
 189. Id. at 45–46, 47 & n.156. 
 190. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55. 
 191. Potter, supra note 6, at 346. 
 192. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55 (“[A]ll Brazilian gas stations are 
required to offer at least E85 ethanol [sic].”). 
 193. See id. (“Brazil’s experience offers some insight on how the United 
States might produce biofuels more efficiently and support biofuel use more 
effectively.”). 
 194. Potter, supra note 6, at 348 & n.129. 
 195. Cf. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 78 (“[T]he attention on ethanol 
may distract researchers from developing new energy possibilities.”). 
 196. Id. at 55. 
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production could be measured in terms of energy production 
per unit of fossil fuel input or ethanol production per acre.197 
Finally, a third kind of policy outlook addresses ethanol 
market forces other than ethanol production or distribution. 
One commentator prescribes that the government mandate 
automobile manufacturers to increase the efficiency of 
automobiles that are partly fueled by ethanol.198 Another 
commentator argues that effective ethanol policies require 
collaboration between the government and private industries in 
advancing common energy goals.199 Other commentators, in 
light of Brazil’s high gasoline taxes,200 suggest that the United 
States also increase its taxes on ethanol’s competitor—
gasoline.201 
2. Lessons of Despair202 
Scholars who examined Brazil’s federal ethanol policies 
and concluded that the United States would be unable to 
replicate Brazil’s success rest this conclusion on three grounds. 
First, the United States cannot overcome the various 
advantages of producing ethanol with sugarcane over those 
with corn.203 Second, the United States cannot replicate the 
Brazilian political regime when the major sugarcane ethanol 
policies were implemented.204 Third, reforming the U.S. ethanol 
distribution system poses an insurmountable barrier.205 
Scholars observe that, in comparison to the United States, 
Brazil possesses several comparative advantages for producing 
ethanol. In making this observation, scholars presume that the 
                                                          
 197. Id. at 53. 
 198. Potter, supra note 6, at 350. Potter acknowledged that the federally-
mandated Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are a step in 
the right direction, but she supported even higher CAFE standards. Id. at 340 
n.75, 350. 
 199. Barbera, supra note 12, at 46; cf. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589. 
Calfucoy examined Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol experience to propose a 
renewable motor fuel development model for developing countries. Id. at 563. 
She argued that the primary reason for Brazil’s ethanol advances is due to 
private and public sectors working together for environmental sustainability 
goals. Id. at 593. 
 200. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 150–52. 
 201. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55. 
 202. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496 (“[R]eproducing Brazil’s 
ethanol success in the United States would be virtually impossible.”). 
 203. See infra text accompanying notes 206–08. 
 204. See infra text accompanying notes 209–12. 
 205. See infra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
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United States will produce corn ethanol206 and not cellulosic 
ethanol. The advantages listed by these scholars include 
features related to growing sugarcane and producing sugarcane 
ethanol. Because of Brazil’s favorable climate for sugarcane, 
ample fertile land, and cheap labor supply, growing sugarcane 
to fuel Brazil’s ethanol production is not taxing.207 In producing 
ethanol, Brazil can accomplish its task at a lower cost by using 
less energy and by placing less strain on farming.208 
Scholars then argue that the United States could not 
implement successful ethanol policies unless it was ruled under 
a dictatorship. These scholars mean that the democratic 
process frustrates centralized government action to spur 
ethanol, such as fixing prices, and compelling gas stations to 
carry ethanol.209 Since Brazil established a democratic 
government, these scholars surmise that even Brazil would 
currently be unsuccessful at incubating a new biofuel.210 
Another commentator seems to tacitly concede this 
argument.211 She argues that the United States’ governing 
arrangement is unfavorable to incubating a new biofuel: “In a 
constitutional republic, the decision-making process . . . is slow 
and cumbersome.”212 
Finally, scholars describe the U.S. ethanol distribution 
case as a classic catch-22 scenario. This view takes the position 
that widespread ethanol distribution through installation of 
pure ethanol pumps is crucial to developing the ethanol 
market.213 Yet, U.S. stations are less likely to offer pure 
ethanol if fewer drivers own FFVs, and drivers are less likely to 
purchase FFVs if few stations offer pure ethanol.214 
3. The Whole Curriculum 
On the specific issue of whether Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol 
industry tax benefits should, for environmental reasons, 
encourage the United States to enact similar tax benefits for 
                                                          
 206. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497–98. 
 207. Potter, supra note 6, at 347. 
 208. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497. 
 209. Id. at 496–97. 
 210. Id. at 497. 
 211. See Potter, supra note 6, at 345–47 (highlighting a relationship 
between political systems and effectiveness of ethanol policies). 
 212. Id. at 345. 
 213. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497. 
 214. Id. 
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cellulosic ethanol, the academic literature provides some 
helpful, but also less helpful insight. 
The more helpful literature addresses the topic of cellulosic 
ethanol tax benefits directly and indirectly. More directly, the 
commentators favor the development of biofuels other than 
corn ethanol,215 and cellulosic ethanol fits the bill. Granted, the 
cellulosic ethanol industry is still inchoate,216 but cellulosic 
ethanol does not need to necessarily supplant corn ethanol. 
Cellulosic ethanol still could help supplement the ethanol 
market. Furthermore, especially in terms of environmental 
impact, cellulosic ethanol has the potential to be greener.217 
More indirectly, commentators suggest that Brazilian 
ethanol policies cannot be implemented wholesale in the 
United States, because these commentators underscore major 
differences between the United States and Brazil. For example, 
a few commentators observe that the success of sugarcane 
ethanol policies was due to the dictatorship regime that 
initiated these policies.218 In contrast, democratic leadership 
can only accomplish certain policies after more deliberation.219 
Thus, these differences suggest that replicating Brazilian 
ethanol policies does not necessary produce identical results. 
The United States may lack some dispositive features—such as 
a dictatorship—which make some Brazilian policies ineffective 
when applied to the United States. 
Another insight less directly related to cellulosic ethanol 
tax benefits that can be gleaned from the scholarship is that 
Congress has the option of formulating a variety of cellulosic 
ethanol policies. Alternatives to tax benefits include incentives 
to build E85 gas pumps220 and policies aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of biofuel production.221 
The less helpful literature recommends policies that tend 
to underestimate the complexities of the U.S. ethanol market in 
three ways. First, recommendations for higher investment in 
the ethanol market seem to reinvent a wobbly wheel. 
Historically, higher investment has not necessarily translated 
                                                          
 215. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 217. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 111–13 (listing that growing 
cellulosic biomass can have land use benefits when compared to growing corn). 
 218. See text accompanying notes 209–12. 
 219. See text accompanying note 212. 
 220. See text accompanying notes 190–92. 
 221. See text accompanying notes 196–97. 
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into intended results. Since 2000, the U.S. federal government 
has funded research for biofuels.222 The recommendation also 
fails to take into account that the costs to the government could 
be wasted. Especially for corn ethanol incentives,223 studies 
suggest that the United States has not been successful in 
reaping the benefits in the areas of energy independence and 
GHG emissions.224 
Second, recommendations for establishing public-private 
collaborations to spur ethanol are unlikely to materialize in 
practice because the U.S. political system is likely to defeat the 
establishment of such collaborations. Scholars already have 
argued that there is government favoritism toward a few 
agribusinesses.225 Even when the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 2012 passed tax incentives for cellulosic ethanol, the 
minority of the Senate Finance Committee Report censured the 
majority for “extend[ing] too many [provisions] that have little 
to do with sound tax policy and are actually harmful, market-
distorting subsidies.”226 Out of the majority’s nearly 100-page 
report,227 the minority only singled out the “subsidizing of so-
called ‘green energy’” as an example.228 As such, if a legislator 
were indeed to submit a bill of public-private ethanol projects, 
the other legislators could find the bill to be a sweetheart deal 
and these legislators could vote against the bill. Indeed, even if 
the fear of favoritism were unfounded, the mere perception that 
the collaboration signals preferential treatment could be a kiss 
of death for a bill.229 
Third, the recommendations that advanced biofuels can 
come to substitute for corn ethanol if only the government were 
to take actions to bring them into fruition, are more 
                                                          
 222. See supra text accompanying note 82 (noting the existence of the 
Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000). 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 35–40 (listing the tax incentives 
for corn ethanol production). 
 224. See, e.g., Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 77 & n.245 (“Since first 
enacted, U.S. tax incentives for ethanol production have . . . encouraged 
increased ethanol fuel production. However, increasing production of corn-
based ethanol will not be effective in achieving the broader goals of energy 
security or reductions in GHG emissions.”); supra text accompanying notes 
38–40 (listing the tax incentives for corn ethanol production). 
 225. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 226. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 112 (2012). 
 227. See id. at 1–3 (listing the contents section of the committee report). 
 228. Id. at 112. 
 229. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. 
government decision making as “slow and cumbersome”). 
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misconceived than visionary. Cellulosic ethanol policies 
illustrate this misconceived understanding in two notable 
ways. As early as 2006, Congress enacted tax benefits for 
cellulosic ethanol.230 Yet the first commercial-scale cellulosic 
ethanol production only came about seven years later.231 
Indeed, Congress’s 2012 adjustment of the tax benefits 
pertaining to cellulosic ethanol implies that Congress’s 2006 
expectations of biofuels were misguided. The Senate Finance 
Committee majority reported that these adjustments to the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) would foster technological 
development.232 If these senators knew what kind of tax 
provisions could successfully foster the development of various 
biofuels, they would likely have enacted them years ago. 
The course of the RFS for cellulosic ethanol is nearly 
parallel to that of the tax benefits. Since 2005, Congress 
created the RFS for cellulosic ethanol, which aspired that, by 
2012, there would be half a billion gallons of commercial 
cellulosic ethanol.233 In addition, Congress created in the RFS a 
safety valve where the EPA could lower the congressional 
mandates.234 Since cellulosic ethanol only became commercially 
viable in 2013,235 the RFS shows that congressional mandates 
were overoptimistic, and Congress was aware of its 
overoptimism.236 
B. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND 
BRAZILIAN ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS 
Though scholars and commentators have produced 
extensive literature on the broader issue of the relevance of 
Brazil’s ethanol policies to U.S. ethanol policies, none of that 
literature is limited to the scope of sugarcane and cellulosic 
ethanol industries’ tax benefits. This Section compares and 
contrasts the tax benefits in order to tease out the topic. 
                                                          
 230. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
 231. See supra text accompanying note 100. 
 232. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 234. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2. 
 236. Cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(“Recognizing the technological challenges, Congress provided for the 
possibility that actual production would fall short of the stated 
requirements.”). 
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1. How the U.S. Cellulosic Ethanol Tax Benefits Differ from 
the Brazilian Sugarcane Tax Benefits 
The U.S. and Brazilian ethanol tax benefits differ in their 
(1) scope; (2) expiration date; (3) tax benefits’ relationship to 
gasoline taxes; (4) the information the benefits offer about tax 
revenue; and (5) the blender’s credit. Unlike the U.S. tax 
benefits, which apply to biofuels other than cellulosic 
ethanol,237 the Brazilian tax benefits provisions are limited to 
ethanol.238 
The U.S. and Brazilian ethanol tax benefits also differ in 
that only the U.S. tax benefits have an end date. In the United 
States, the bonus depreciation provisions expired on January 1, 
2014, and the blender’s credit expired on December 31, 2013.239 
Further, unlike the United States, the Brazilian tax codes 
provide, facially, a discrete tax treatment for gasoline and 
ethanol. And this discrete treatment is not de minimis. In 
Brazil, the gasoline producers are taxed at least three times 
more than the ethanol producers.240 
Fourth, Brazilian ethanol tax benefits offer more 
information than the U.S. ethanol tax benefits, especially about 
the tax revenue expenditures. In the United States, the IRC 
provisions that benefit cellulosic ethanol only give information 
about the kind of taxpayer or source to which the provision 
applies. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blender’s credit, now 
the second-generation biofuel blender’s credit, only informs the 
taxpayer who or what kind of source the code addresses.241 In 
contrast, the Brazilian ethanol blender’s credit mentions the 
kind of taxpayer—whether producer, importer, or distributor—
and the use of the collected revenue—whether for pensions, 
                                                          
 237. See, e.g., supra note 98 (explaining that the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act nested cellulosic ethanol under “second generation biofuel”). 
 238. In fact, the Brazilian revenue codes use the terms “álcool estílico 
combustível” (ethyl alcohol fuel), Lei No. 10.636, de 30 de Dezembro de 2002, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2002 (Braz.), and “álcool” 
(alcohol), Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.), but, in effect, the codes apply only to ethanol. 
See Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 490 (stating that there are 
“significant tax incentives for ethanol production in Brazil”). 
 239. See supra notes 94, 98 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 155–56 (explaining that the 
COFINS for a gasoline producer is 22.44%, while for an ethanol producer it is 
6.9%). 
 241. See supra text accompanying note 96. 
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social security, etc.242 In the United States, while reports from 
congressional committees may offer some insight into the main 
aims for the tax legislation, these reports are silent as to how 
the federal government will spend the tax revenue.243 
Finally, though only the United States provides tax credits 
for producers that blend ethanol with gasoline,244 the difference 
between Brazil and the United States is a bit more complex. 
Brazil only repealed its blender’s credit late in 2013.245 
2. What the Tax Benefits Have in Common 
The U.S. and Brazilian tax benefits have two features in 
common: (1) potential benefits for each country’s own 
workforce; and (2) the context of a larger umbrella of policies 
favoring ethanol production. Both the United States and Brazil 
enacted their respective tax benefits taking into consideration 
their national workforces. In the United States, the Senate 
Committee Majority explained that one of the reasons for the 
majority’s changes to the ethanol plant bonus depreciation 
provisions was to “creat[e] manufacturing jobs in the United 
States.”246 In Brazil, the tax revenue collected under the 
PIS/PASEP is spent on pensions of business and government 
employees.247 The PIS/PASEP’s relationship to funding of 
pensions is further complicated because, in effect, gasoline 
producers subsidize the ethanol producers’ contributions to the 
pensions. Compared to the gasoline producers, ethanol 
producers have a lighter PIS/PASEP tax burden because a 
PIS/PASEP of a gasoline producer is three times higher than 
that of an ethanol producer.248 
Additionally, in both countries, tax benefits are only a 
carrot in a larger basket of policies affecting ethanol 
production. For example, in addition to tax benefits, both the 
                                                          
 242. See supra notes 149, 153, and accompanying text for information 
about the uses of PIS/PASEP and COFINS, respectively. 
 243. E.g., S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96 (2012) (“The Committee acknowledges 
that encouraging manufacturing of biofuels in the United States is important 
for fostering innovative new technology, encouraging energy independence, 
and creating manufacturing jobs in the United States.”). 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 154. 
 246. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96. 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52. 
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United States and Brazil mandate that ethanol be blended 
with gasoline.249 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 
Tax benefits that spur ethanol production in the United 
States and Brazil have the likelihood of impacting these 
countries’ environment, and these environmental impacts can 
be considered in the areas of GHG emissions, biodiversity, land 
use, and possibly air pollutant emissions. 
1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
When sugarcane ethanol production is placed next to 
cellulosic ethanol production, it is unclear which kind of 
ethanol emits less GHGs because many questions about the 
future of cellulosic ethanol production remain unanswered. 
Sugarcane ethanol production is recognized as emitting a low 
amount of GHGs,250 and the production is in the process of 
emitting less.251 On the one hand, cellulosic ethanol industry 
executives claim that cellulosic ethanol plants use few GHG-
intensive sources,252 and, assuming that cellulosic biomass 
would be made up of native grasses, one could surmise that 
growing native grasses will raise fewer GHG emission concerns 
than sugarcane ethanol production.253 
On the other hand, if cellulosic ethanol biomass were to 
mainly be made up of corn stover and nonnative plants,254 
cellulosic ethanol may not trump sugarcane ethanol. If 
cellulosic ethanol plants were to primarily use corn stover, 
cellulosic ethanol production’s emission of GHGs could be 
significantly higher than the sugarcane ethanol production 
emissions. First, corn stover may require increased use of 
                                                          
 249. Compare supra text accompanying notes 86–89 (explaining the RFS 
program in the United States), with supra text accompanying notes 141–43 
(explaining the mandated blending rates in Brazil). Yet, despite these 
mandates, the scheme of the U.S. and Brazilian mandates and the countries’ 
other ethanol production incentives are not identical. Further scholarship 
could examine the effect of the differences on the countries’ ethanol industries. 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 158–62. 
 251. See supra text accompanying notes 163–68 (summarizing the harms of 
the harvest-burning practice and the Brazilian government initiatives to 
address those harms). 
 252. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 106. 
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fertilizers.255 In addition, corn stover could implicate some of 
the same GHG emission concerns as corn ethanol,256 such as 
global indirect land use changes.257 Finally, growing nonnative 
plants is energy intensive.258 
2. Biodiversity 
The differences between the environmental effects of 
cellulosic and sugarcane ethanol on biodiversity are 
inconclusive for at least two reasons. The effects depend on the 
kind of cellulosic biomass the ethanol plants will use, and the 
real facts of sugarcane ethanol’s threat to Brazil’s Amazon and 
Cerrado regions. 
While current cellulosic biomass may not threaten plant 
and animal species,259 prospective cellulosic biomass may not 
be so forgiving. Not only could some cellulosic biomass cultivars 
become evasive, but the current regulatory scheme allows 
biomass to grow in Conservation Reserve Program land.260 
To further complicate the matter, in the Brazilian regions 
where biome protection is most needed—the Amazon and 
Cerrado—the protection may be lacking. That lack of protection 
could come about if people and industries displaced by 
sugarcane ethanol production261 were to settle in the Amazon 
and Cerrado and authorities were to fail to enforce the relevant 
conservation codes.262 
3. Land Use 
While the scholarship addressing cellulosic ethanol 
production’s effects on land use mainly considers that cellulosic 
raises fewer land use issues than corn ethanol,263 these 
                                                          
 255. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
 256. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (explaining that Midwestern 
corn ethanol industry actors could be spurred to adapt their plants to 
producing corn stover cellulosic ethanol). 
 257. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (detailing the course of 
events where (1) corn market fluctuations cause (2) decreases in the amount of 
land that is highly effective in sequestering GHGs). 
 258. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 259. INEOS Bio and Abengoa use waste as biomass; POET uses corn cobs. 
Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20. 
 260. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 174, 178. 
 262. See supra notes 175, 180 and accompanying text (discussing and 
citing sources that suggest that the BFC may not be properly enforced). 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13. 
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considerations may still help to compare cellulosic ethanol 
production with sugarcane ethanol production. 
First, cellulosic ethanol production could be less 
geographically concentrated than sugarcane ethanol 
production. In Brazil, sugarcane fields and sugarcane ethanol 
plants are concentrated in the Southeast.264 Commentators 
predicted in 2008 that cellulosic ethanol plants can be more 
dispersed.265 The current locations of the larger U.S. cellulosic 
ethanol plants support the prediction because these cellulosic 
ethanol plants are found in several states spread out across the 
continental United States.266 
Still, other observers suggest that cellulosic ethanol 
production could be as geographically concentrated as its 
sugarcane ethanol counterpart. This view predicts that 
Midwestern corn ethanol producers could become leading 
cellulosic ethanol producers by transitioning from cornstarch 
biomass to corn stover.267 
Yet, even if cellulosic ethanol production were to be as 
geographically concentrated as sugarcane ethanol production, 
cellulosic ethanol production could use water more efficiently 
than sugarcane ethanol production. Specifically, producing 
cellulosic ethanol using the cellulosic biomass miscanthus x 
giganteus could raise fewer water use concerns than producing 
sugarcane ethanol. 268 
4. Possible Environmental Effects 
Finally, when compared to sugarcane ethanol production, 
cellulosic ethanol production could emit fewer air pollutants 
than sugarcane ethanol. While the literature addressing the 
environmental effects of cellulosic ethanol production are silent 
as to whether the production could emit an alarming amount of 
air pollutants, the literature addressing sugarcane ethanol 
production does mention the air pollutant emission issue. 
Specifically, sugarcane ethanol production is related to a higher 
                                                          
 264. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21. 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 266. Wald, Milestone Claimed, supra note 116 (Florida); see supra text 
accompanying note 75 (Iowa and Kansas). 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 78 (citing a commentator positing 
that cellulosic ethanol may be mainly produced by current Midwestern corn 
ethanol industry actors). 
 268. Compare supra text accompanying note 114 (efficient water use), with 
supra text accompanying note 182 (water depletion). 
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rate of respiratory ailments among younger and older 
populations.269 
D. INSPIRATIONS FOR THE U.S. CELLULOSIC ETHANOL INDUSTRY 
To review, some of the literature addressing U.S. and 
Brazilian ethanol could be relevant to the U.S. cellulosic 
ethanol industry, the tax benefits of the United States and 
Brazil are somewhat different, and the United States could 
experience some environmental gains if it were to spur 
cellulosic ethanol production. A question remains: what are the 
tax benefits to best spur cellulosic ethanol production? 
1. Proposed Changes for the Internal Revenue Code 
For the United States to adopt tax benefits more like those 
in place in Brazil, the IRC could be changed in at least some of 
four ways.270 First, the benefits could address cellulosic ethanol 
more explicitly, rather than addressing cellulosic ethanol by 
lumping it along with other advanced fuels. 
Second, Congress could eliminate the present tax benefits’ 
sunset provisions, rather than just extending the provisions’ 
dates through subsequent amendments. 
Third, Congress could draft provisions where cellulosic 
ethanol producers receive indirect tax benefits through 
provisions that treat gasoline and cellulosic ethanol producers 
differently. For example, the IRC could have a tax benefit 
where gasoline producers’ aggregate revenue was to be taxed at 
a higher rate than the aggregate revenue of cellulosic ethanol 
producers.271 
Fourth, the tax benefits could offer more information about 
the use of the revenue collected, rather than only referring to 
the kind of taxpayer involved. For instance, the IRC provisions 
that designate cellulosic ethanol plants’ depreciation bonus 
could indicate whether the provisions affect any specific federal 
funds.272 
                                                          
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71. 
 270. The option for the United States to repeal its blender’s credit is not 
completely on point because Brazil repealed its blender’s credit only last 
December. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 154. 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52 (describing the Brazilian 
PIS/PASEP tax where gasoline producers have a higher tax rate than ethanol 
producers). 
 272. The Brazilian ethanol tax benefits relate to funds addressing 
government projects regarding transportation fuels and resources, employee 
1150 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
2. The Merits of the Proposed Changes 
Adopting any one of the changes may not cause a boom in 
the cellulosic ethanol industry,273 but some changes are more 
likely to spur cellulosic ethanol production than others. 
a. Elimination of Sunset Provisions 
The elimination of sunset provisions could be the most 
effective at spurring cellulosic ethanol production for at least 
two reasons. This change in tax benefits could encourage 
greater commitment from cellulosic ethanol producers and 
could attract more industry investors.274 As the development of 
Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry shows, even with some 
indirect government support, the ethanol industry may be 
driven to modernize itself.275 
Additionally, the elimination of sunset provisions could be 
more effective than other cellulosic ethanol industry incentives. 
Unlike formal public-private collaborations, the elimination of 
sunset provisions is less likely to be shunned by political 
opponents. Opponents would be unlikely to decry that this 
elimination is an act of favoritism, because the government 
would only provide the benefits if cellulosic ethanol production 
occurred.276 
                                                          
pensions, and social security. See supra text accompanying notes 147, 149, 
153. 
 273. See Potter, supra note 6, at 345–51 (analyzing the developments of 
U.S. corn ethanol and Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol to conclude that “[t]he 
United States is not without hope, but neither is it in an enviable position”). 
But see Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496–98 (listing reasons and 
expounding on why “reproducing Brazil’s ethanol success in the United States 
would be virtually impossible”). 
 274. Cf. Robert F. Service, Is There a Road Ahead for Cellulosic Ethanol?, 
329 SCIENCE 784, 785 (2010) (“‘Until the government makes it absolutely clear 
that [cellulosic tax benefits are] a long-term policy, investors will be reluctant 
to support the [cellulosic ethanol] industry.’” (quoting Sean O’Hanlon, 
executive director of the American Biofuels Council in Miami, Florida)). 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 135–39 (explaining that industry 
drive, along with E22 mandates, and other factors, helped Brazil’s ethanol 
industry to recover); see also Potter, supra note 6, at 336 (“[D]espite 
that . . . sugar and ethanol industries experienced difficult times [in the 
1990s], instead of folding, both industries chose to cut costs and improve 
production efficiency.”). 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 225–29 (arguing that policies that 
require public-private collaborations will likely be killed by the political 
process). 
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b. More Information About Revenue Expenditure 
The change that requires tax benefits provisions to provide 
more information about the use of the revenue being collected 
could be effective because the change could facilitate the 
political deliberative process. This measure would make the 
resulting provision more transparent, and thus, the legislators 
debating the provision are less likely to dispute that the 
expressed end result is really a pretense. In the American 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012’s Senate Finance Committee, a 
sticking point between the majority and the minority in 
enacting the 2012 cellulosic ethanol tax benefits was whether 
the benefits would really benefit the U.S. economy and not only 
a few private interests.277 Thus, if the IRC were to clarify how 
part of its revenue could affect a specific federal fund, such as a 
fund allotted for employee pensions, a group of congresspersons 
would be less likely to allege that the others really intend to 
curry favor with private interests.278 
c. Differential Treatment of Gasoline and Cellulosic Ethanol 
Producers 
The taxing of gasoline producers at relatively higher rates 
could, in theory, also spur cellulosic ethanol production because 
that tax measure could provide cellulosic ethanol a comparative 
advantage.279 Moreover, insofar as eliminating the cellulosic 
tax benefits’ sunset provisions could result in a shortage in tax 
revenue, the revenue collected from the gasoline industry could 
make the difference. That said, it is possible that the U.S. 
political deliberative process could vote off the measure of 
taxing one industry at a higher rate than the other because 
                                                          
 277. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 112 (2012) (“The tax code should not be used 
as a tool for picking winners and losers, nor should it reward politically 
favored industries or penalize disfavored ones.”); see supra text accompanying 
note 228. 
 278. Cf. Donald B. Susswein, Managing Our Energy Addiction: A Road 
Map, 115 TAX NOTES 659, 663 (2007) (proposing a tax framework to 
discourage gasoline use, and explaining that the framework would be 
acceptable to Democrats because, for example, the framework addresses 
climate change; and also acceptable to Republicans because, for example, the 
framework reduces payroll taxes). 
 279. See Service, supra note 274, at 784–85 (citing an economist who 
argued for tax benefits favoring cellulosic ethanol over gasoline because the 
economist viewed such benefits as an opportunity for the cellulosic ethanol 
industry to “become competitive and established”). 
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legislators could perceive the measure as a blatant preferential 
treatment.280 
d. Explicitly Addressing Cellulosic Ethanol 
A measure that amends the tax benefits to make them 
more explicit so that they aim at cellulosic ethanol may not be 
effective in spurring cellulosic ethanol production. If the IRC 
bills were to benefit cellulosic ethanol expressly and not other 
advanced biofuels, such provisions would draw attention to the 
view that the sponsors or supporters only intend to favor 
private interests and not the American population as a 
whole.281 Unfortunately, these views need not have a strong 
foundation in order to frustrate the enactment of the tax 
benefits.282 
3. Application of the Proposed Changes to the U.S. Cellulosic 
Ethanol Industry 
An increase in cellulosic ethanol production facilitated by 
adopting tax benefits akin to those ethanol benefits in place in 
Brazil could have meaningful environmental benefits in the 
United States for two reasons. First, in some ways cellulosic 
ethanol is environmentally on a par with the world’s reigning 
ethanol,283 Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol. Second, increasing the 
production of cellulosic ethanol in the United States would 
have more comparative environmental benefits than the 
dominant ethanol in the United States,284 corn ethanol. 
Overall, the environmental effects of cellulosic ethanol 
production are unlikely to be more detrimental than those of 
sugarcane ethanol production. Cellulosic ethanol production 
most likely raises fewer land use concerns than sugarcane 
                                                          
 280. See Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 14 (discussing the 
prevalence among economists of taxing “fossil fuel productions,” noting the 
merits of the tax approach, but concluding that “there does not appear to be 
any appetite in Congress for a fossil fuel” tax); cf. supra text accompanying 
notes 225–29 (discussing the legislature’s rejection of a bill favoring one 
industry over other industries, but in the agribusiness context). 
 281. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 56–57 (describing commentary that 
implicated corn ethanol production in special interests in policymaking). 
 282. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the U.S. 
government decision making as “cumbersome”). 
 283. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing reasons why 
sugarcane ethanol is perceived as successful). 
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24. 
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ethanol production.285 Additionally, even if cellulosic ethanol 
production does not fare better than sugarcane ethanol 
production in terms of lower GHG emissions, fewer threats to 
biodiversity, and air pollution emissions, the literature does not 
conclude that cellulosic ethanol production is worse.286 
Even if the overall environmental benefits of cellulosic 
ethanol production could not surpass those of sugarcane 
ethanol, cellulosic ethanol would still fare better than corn 
ethanol.287 The comparative environmental gains of cellulosic 
ethanol production over that of corn ethanol apply to GHG 
emissions,288 land use concerns,289 and potentially air pollutant 
emissions.290 
CONCLUSION 
A society reliant on motor fuel should not expect to fill up 
its gas tank at the expense of the environment. The United 
States’ reliance on motor fuel raises the concern of whether 
motor fuel could be produced while placing a lesser strain on 
the environment. While the United States already has an 
established corn ethanol industry that is a player in the motor 
fuel mix, corn ethanol is not regarded, especially in terms of 
environmental impact, as being on the same level playing field 
as Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. Recently, the cellulosic ethanol 
industry emerged as a potential fuel in the U.S. motor fuel 
market. Therefore, the cellulosic ethanol’s emergence raises an 
                                                          
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 263–68. 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 250–60, 269. 
 287. This proposition assumes that cellulosic ethanol’s environmental 
impact is not being compared against imported sugarcane ethanol. See 
generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080–85 
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining California’s Fuel Standard, which seeks to measure 
the total carbon intensity of different varieties of domestic and foreign 
ethanol). 
 288. Compare supra text accompanying notes 58–62 (describing several 
studies that note that corn ethanol is ineffective in reducing GHG emissions), 
with supra text accompanying notes 102–06 (describing studies that show a 
mixed view on the effectiveness of cellulosic ethanol in reducing GHG 
emissions). 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13 (pointing to ways cellulosic 
biomass raises fewer land use concerns than corn). 
 290. Compare text accompanying notes 63–68 (suggesting that corn 
ethanol may not be effective in combating air pollution), with text 
accompanying note 269 (stating that literature on cellulosic ethanol 
production is silent as to whether the production could emit alarming amounts 
of air pollutants). 
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issue of whether the cellulosic ethanol industry could learn 
some lessons from the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol industry 
model. 
An inquiry into Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry tax 
benefits sheds light on several ways Congress could change the 
cellulosic ethanol industry tax benefits, which could ultimately 
result in significant environmental gains. The past scholarship 
has not specifically examined Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol 
industry tax benefits, or recognized the United States’ 
cellulosic ethanol industry as a potential market player. Yet, 
after probing into the relevant Brazilian tax benefits, there 
emerge several ways that U.S. tax benefits could be changed 
when addressing the cellulosic ethanol industry, such as the 
elimination of sunset provisions and providing more 
information about revenue expenditures. These tax-benefits 
changes would result in an increase in the production of 
cellulosic ethanol, which, especially when compared to the more 
established corn ethanol, would result in significant 
environmental benefits. 
 
